Pakistan's Proxy War in Kashmir: A Dossier of Support for Terror
Training Camps and Launch Pads in Pakistan & PoK
One of the clearest indicators of Pakistan's deep involvement in the Kashmir insurgency is the existence of militant training camps on Pakistani soil and in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Since the late 1980s, dozens of such camps have operated with impunity:
Muridke, Punjab (Pakistan): The sprawling campus of the Lashkar-e-Taiba's parent organization (Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad) in Muridke has long been used to indoctrinate and train jihadists. Terrorist recruits undergo physical conditioning, arms training, and guerrilla tactics here under the tutelage of LeT commanders. It was from Muridke that batches of LeT fighters, including possibly those who perpetrated Mumbai 2008, graduated. As revealed in Operation Sindoor targets, Markaz Taiba in Muridke was managed by top LeT operatives like Abu Jundal - highlighting that it remains a terror hub.
Balakot, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: The Jaish-e-Mohammed ran a major training center at Balakot, deep within Pakistan. This camp, set in the hills and able to house hundreds of cadres at a time, trained militants in explosives, combat techniques, and suicide bombing indoctrination. It was precisely this facility that India struck in 2019 to avenge the Pulwama attack - a strike that exposed the camp's existence to the world. Despite Pakistan's denials, intelligence from various sources confirmed the Balakot facility's purpose as a JeM training ground.
Muzaffarabad & Kotli, PoK: In Pakistani-held Kashmir, areas like Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Manshera, and Forward Kahuta have hosted multiple launch pads and training sites. The United Jihad Council - an umbrella of Kashmiri militant groups based in Muzaffarabad - coordinated training and infiltration from these places. For instance, the Hizbul Mujahideen maintained camps near Muzaffarabad where local Kashmiri recruits (as well as Pakistani Punjabis and others) received arms training before crossing the LoC. India's surgical strikes in 2016 hit some of these launch pads, underscoring that they were active and facilitated cross-border raids.
Other Areas: The ISI also provided remote training in Afghanistan (during the Taliban's 1996-2001 regime) to Kashmiri militants, leveraging camps that had once churned out anti-Soviet mujahideen. Some segments of Kashmiri fighters trained alongside groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen in eastern Afghanistan in the 90s. Furthermore, Pakistan's port city of Karachi has been a haven and meeting point for militants transiting to other regions.
American intelligence and the United Nations have repeatedly documented such camps. For example, post-9/11, when the US invaded Afghanistan, several Taliban/Al-Qaeda training camps relocated to PoK and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP, now KPK) with tacit support from elements of Pakistani security - these often doubled up as Kashmiri militant training sites.
Infiltration and Border Assistance
Training is just one half - getting the militants into Indian territory is the other. Pakistan's army and Rangers have systematically provided covering fire and logistical support for infiltrators along the Line of Control:
Cover Fire & Diversions: It became routine that whenever infiltration teams attempted to cross, the Pakistani Army would engage Indian posts with small arms or mortar fire as a diversion. Especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, intense cross-border shelling in certain sectors often masked infiltration attempts. These were not rogue incidents but part of Pakistani military strategy.
Guides and Navigation: The terrain of the LoC is treacherous. Pakistan's Border Action Teams (BATs) - comprising Special Services Group commandos and militants - would often enter Indian territory not just to ambush patrols but to clear paths and guide larger militant columns through difficult routes. Indian forces have on numerous occasions recovered sophisticated navigation equipment, snow boots, and rations on killed infiltrators that clearly originated from Pakistani military stores.
Launch Pads: Just on the Pakistani side of the LoC, in forested or village areas, Pakistan established temporary camps known as launch pads. Here, squads of militants would assemble, finalise plans, and then wait for opportune moments (like bad weather or moonless nights) to infiltrate. These pads were typically within a few kilometers of the LoC, often in Pakistani Army's protective shadow. The fact India targeted launch pads in 2016 and 2025's Operation Sindoor shows these remain a critical link in the terror supply chain.
Pakistan's support has extended even to the point of its regular soldiers directly indulging in violent actions. The Pakistani BAT operations are a gruesome example - there have been instances of BATs crossing over to attack Indian patrols and beheading Indian soldiers (e.g., incidents in 2013 and 2017), indicating a level of barbarity employed as psychological warfare, directly involving Pakistani personnel in terroristic acts.
Safe Havens for Militant Leaders
Pakistan's complicity is perhaps best exemplified by how it openly harbors the leadership of anti-India terrorist organizations. A few prominent cases:
Syed Salahuddin (Hizbul Mujahideen chief): Salahuddin, designated a global terrorist by the US in 2017, has lived in Pakistan (mostly PoK, with residence in Islamabad as well) for decades. He regularly addresses rallies in Muzaffarabad, often flanked by ISI handlers. As recently as 2020, Salahuddin was seen offering funeral prayers for a fallen comrade in Rawalpindi in a public gathering - a clear sign of official tolerance. Pakistan not only hosts him but has defended him; its Foreign Office in 2017 outrageously termed his violent campaign "legitimate struggle" even after the US blacklisted him.
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed (LeT/JuD chief): For years after 26/11, Hafiz Saeed lived freely in Lahore, addressing large gatherings calling for jihad against India. He was put under house arrest sporadically when international pressure peaked, only to be released when attention waned. His organization JuD ran dozens of schools and charities - often a front to recruit militants - openly. Only in 2019, facing the FATF's heat, did Pakistan finally charge and later convict Saeed on terror-financing (not for violence). But even in custody, his clout is evident; he was allowed to keep influencing.
Masood Azhar (JeM chief): After being freed in the 1999 IC-814 hijacking deal, Masood Azhar founded Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur, Pakistan. Despite JeM's hand in Parliament attack, Mumbai attacks, Pathankot, and Pulwama, Azhar has never faced real action in Pakistan. He lives at Bahawalpur in a protected compound. Pakistan denied his presence for years to stymie UN sanctions - one Pakistani diplomat absurdly claimed Azhar was "missing" - until Masood Azhar was finally listed as a UN proscribed terrorist in May 2019. To date, Pakistan hasn't confirmed any arrest; Azhar is believed to be shielded by the state, perhaps "in hiding" under ISI's watch.
Others: Numerous other militant figures - Lashkar commanders like Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi (Mumbai attack mastermind, briefly jailed then out on bail, reportedly running a dairy farm business), HuM's Fazlur Rehman Khalil, Al Badr's leadership, etc. - have all enjoyed Pakistani sanctuary. Even international pariahs like Osama bin Laden found refuge in Pakistan until 2011, and Taliban leaders lived in Quetta and Karachi for years ("Quetta Shura"), underscoring a pattern of Pakistan as a terror haven.
This hospitality extends to organizational infrastructure as well. Groups banned on paper by the UN or US often simply rename and continue. For instance, JeM often operates under aliases like Al-Rehmat Trust. Lashkar-e-Taiba morphed into Jamaat-ud-Dawa, then a so-called humanitarian outfit Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation, and when those were banned, a new alias emerged. These entities have bank accounts, real estate, and training facilities in Pakistan - which the state could shut down if it truly wanted to.
Financing and Arms Supply
The machinery of insurgency requires funds and arms, and Pakistan has been the conduit for both:
Funding: A significant part of the funding for Kashmir militancy has come via Pakistan's intelligence apparatus. The Hawala route was common - money from Pakistani or Gulf sources funneled through shell traders into Kashmir. India has intercepted countless cash transfers and financing networks tied back to Pakistan. In one example, the NIA in 2017 cracked down on separatist leaders in Kashmir, uncovering that ISI was routing money through local businessmen to pay off stone-pelters and militants, confirming direct financing. This was a factor in FATF keeping Pakistan on its grey list - failure to stop terror financing.
Weapons: Pakistan's military stockpiles have been a source of weaponry for militants. Early in the insurgency, rifles like AK-47/56 of Chinese or Russian make flooded in via Pakistan. Later, more sophisticated arms appeared: sniper rifles with Pakistani ordnance markings, military-grade plastic explosives (like the RDX used in IEDs), night-vision devices, and now even M-4 US-made carbines (likely pilfered from Afghan battlefields). Pakistani arms factories in Darra Adam Khel and elsewhere also produce copies of guns that find their way to militants. Recently, drones dropping weapons packages in Punjab have carried grenades and AK rifles with Pakistani markings. Indian forces even captured a Pakistani drone intact in 2020 with a payload of rifles and heroin.
Logistics: Communications equipment used by militants (radios, satellite phones) have often been procured and programmed in Pakistan. Safe houses for Kashmiri militants in Pakistan, medical treatment for injured fighters in Pakistani military hospitals under fake identities - all these logistics have been facilitated by the ISI.
All this points to a high level of state collusion. The average Kashmiri militant or a foreign fighter wouldn't be able to sustain without this backend support.
Official Rhetoric and Policy
Pakistan's official stance on Kashmir militancy has been duplicitous. On one hand, at global forums Pakistan claims to only give "moral and diplomatic support" to what it calls an indigenous freedom struggle. On the other hand, domestic Pakistani narratives often lionize the militants as "freedom fighters". Pakistani political leaders have shared stages with UN-designated terrorists - for instance, in 2019 Pakistan's federal minister shared a protest stage with Hafiz Saeed's son.
Former President Pervez Musharraf openly admitted in a 2015 interview that Pakistan "raised and supported" militant groups like LeT to carry out proxy war against India in Kashmir - calling them heroes at the time, though acknowledging things "got out of hand" later. Such admissions (later half-denied) corroborate India's consistent position that the insurgency is anything but indigenous.
Even currently, Pakistan's strategy hasn't fundamentally changed, though tactics have adjusted (for example, pushing The Resistance Front narrative to mask Pakistan's hand by giving Lashkar a local-sounding name). But the presence of hundreds of Kashmiri youth in Pakistani training camps (as evidenced by encounters where militants killed have Pakistani passports or address IDs on them, or by social media traces of youths who crossed to PoK) cannot be plausibly denied.
International Recognition of Pakistan's Role
Global perception has shifted over time to acknowledge Pakistan's role. The U.S. State Department's annual terrorism reports continuously single out Pakistan for hosting terrorist safe havens and letting Lashkar and Jaish operate. The UN Secretary General's reports on ISIS or Al-Qaeda have listed Pakistan-based outfits in their briefs on terrorism threats. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) kept Pakistan on a watchlist for four years precisely due to "strategic deficiencies" in curbing terror funding and UNSC sanctions enforcement.
Perhaps the strongest acknowledgment came after the U.S. Navy SEALs found Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 - while that was about Al-Qaeda, it symbolized Pakistan's double game. Subsequent Western commentary often lumped Pakistan's support to anti-India jihadists as part of that double game. For example, Admiral Mike Mullen's famous statement in 2011 calling the Haqqani Network a "veritable arm of the ISI" could well apply to groups like LeT and JeM vis-à-vis Pakistan's security establishment.
In conclusion, the evidence of Pakistan's support for terrorism in Kashmir (and beyond in India) is overwhelming:
Training camps and infrastructure on its soil,
Active facilitation of infiltration and armed support,
Safe haven and non-action against terror masterminds,
Financial, logistical and ideological backing.
This proxy war apparatus has been running for decades. It ebbs and flows under international scrutiny but has never been fully dismantled. As long as it persists, India faces a thorny challenge to secure Kashmir. However, India's multi-pronged countermeasures - military, intelligence, diplomatic - have significantly attrited this terror infrastructure. What remains clear is that lasting peace in Kashmir will be elusive until Pakistan decisively stops exporting terrorism - something India rightfully demands and the world increasingly echoes.